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James Madison and the Burger Court:
Converging Views of Church-State Separation
PATRICIA E. CURRY*

For a Court that many thought might prove prone to restraint, the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger has proven remarkably activist in sketching the boundaries of separation of church and state. Much
of the gloss on the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment2 is found in the Supreme Court decisions of the seventies, including decisions regarding governmental aid to predominantly churchrelated private schools. Although the Burger Court, as the Warren Court
before it,3 has struggled to discover a meaningful and cohesive interpretation of the two religion clauses, the doctrinal basis of the Burger Court's
decisions seems convoluted.
The role that the framers should play in constitutional decisionmaking
is widely debated.4 Those who seek authority in the framers' opinions find
not only that the founders made few presently known utterances about
religious freedom when they drafted the religion clauses,5 but also that
the practices of the original states varied too widely to reveal a consensus.'
* B.A. 1968, Ph. D. 1973, Indiana University. Visiting Assistant Professor of Political
Science, Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis.
See, e.g., Duscha, ChiefJustice Burger,N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1969, S 6 (Magazine), at 140,
cited in Note, ChiefJustice Burger: Whither Now the Supreme Court?, 15 S.D. L. REV. 41, 63
(1970). But see Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, 1970 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 91.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 50-79 (1964).
Compare C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2-3 (1947), quoted in P. BREST, PROCESSES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 170-71 (1975), and E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL

REASONING 59 (1949), and Wofford, The BlindingLight: The Uses of History in Constitutional
Interpretation,31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502,528-33 (1964), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting), and Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring), and T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 123-24 (8th ed. with
additions by W. Carrington 1927) (1st ed. Boston 1868), and J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 298-301 (4th ed. 1873) (1st ed. Boston 1833).
5 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 526 (1950). Indeed, one may con-

clude that religious liberty is protected through the fifth amendment. Madison wrote that
a man "has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the possession and
practice dictated by them," Madison, Essay on Property,reprintedin 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 101 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) [hereinafter cited as WRITINGS], and that "[g]overnment is in-

stituted to protect property of every sort.... This being the end of government, that alone
is a just government, which impartiallysecures to every man, whatever is his own." Id. at
102 (emphasis added). Madison added that governments that guarded possessions, but did
not protect citizens in the enjoyment of their opinions, "a more valuable property," id., should
be praised sparingly. Id. at 101.
" Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and Delaware had no state church; New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Georgia and Virginia discarded theirs; the other states retained state churches. 1 A. STOKES, supra note 5, at 526; see id. at 164-66, 508.
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Consequently, in order to understand the religion clauses,' one should consider the writings of James Madison, the father of the Constitution.'
Madison's influence on religious thought,9 as well as on the Constitution, compels resort to his opinions. Many scholars'" and Supreme Court
Justices" have interpreted Madison's remarks as intending absolute
separation of church and state. Only a minority maintain that he may have
been ambiguous about separation." A fuller understanding of Madison's
writings reveals that his views on separation were too subtle to be labeled
absolutist and too thorough to be labeled ambiguous. Such an understanding comes both from his writings and, in part, from examining the Burger
Court's opinions. The Burger Court increasingly and often correctly echoes
Madison, as when it bases its concerns about political divisiveness on
Madison's faction arguments' 3 for separation. Particularly relevant to
modern constitutional interpretation, and too rarely considered by the
Burger Court, are the purpose of Madison's separation, his assumptions
and their continuing validity, and the circumstances that might justify
departing from Madison's original plan of separation.'4
This article examines Madison's view of separation and relates it to his
view of government. It considers how these two views depend on two basic
Madisonian values, the control of faction and the encouragement of multiple sects. The article next examines the modern Court's interpretation
of Madison's writings, highlighting the problems created by an incomplete
I Most of the founders supported religion and believed in religious freedom. Id. at 514;
see THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). They likely would have had
difficulty legislating comprehensively on religion, however. The brevity of the religion clauses
requires interpretation for which Madison's writings are an important source.
I See E. BURNS, JAMES MADISON 190-91 (1938); M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197-98 (1913). Gaillard Hunt, editor of the WRITINGS, supranote 5,
noted that "in theoretical knowledge of government he surpassed all his associates:' G. HUNT,
THE LIFE OF JAMES MADISON 112-13 (1902).
' Madison's MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1784) did
more than any other document prior to the first amendment debates to generate the idea
of a mutually friendly separation of church and state. 1 A. STOKES, supra note 5, at 27. His
role in the struggle for religious freedom in Virginia was that of an "exceptionally warm
friend of religious freedom." Id. at 527-28. For discussion of the complicated issue of churchstate separation in Virginia, see H. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE INVIRGINIA
(1910).
"*E.g., R. KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON 70-80 (1971); Konvitz, Separationof ChurchandState:
The FirstFreedom, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 44 (1949).
1 See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947); id. at 28-63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
12E.g., P. KAUPER, supranote 3, at 50.
3 Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion,
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community:' THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
1"Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,122-26 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (history continues to be wellspring of constitutional interpretation, and one should
blend history with contemporary problems).
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reading of his works. By examining opinions of the Burger Court, the article shows that Madison's faction argument has reappeared as a political
divisiveness test, and comes to grips with the values of control of faction
and encouragement of sects. Finally, the article concludes that, although
the early Burger Court was increasingly willing to sacrifice such other
values as free exercise in order to control faction, the Court's most recent decisions turn away from this concern with faction and increasingly
encourage multiple sects by upholding aid to sectarian institutions.
MADISON'S VIEW OF SEPARATION
The Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
Those who label Madison an absolutist on separation can cite considerable evidence,' 5 including especially his 1784 Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.16 One can understand neither
the Memorial nor its relationship to the first amendment and Madison's
theory of government, however, unless one understands his thought and
the circumstances preceding the Memorial.
When a convention met in Williamsburg in 1776 to draft a constitution
for Virginia," Madison objected that the language of George Mason's
original draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 8 might require no more
than toleration of dissenters by a state-established church. 9 Madison's
substitute language' punctuated his aversion to church-state alliance with
a natural rights argument that all men are entitled to free exercise of
religious belief. The Virginia convention approved Madison's free exercise language.
In 1784 Patrick Henry introduced in the Virginia General Assembly a
"Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion" to
support Christianity by dividing taxes among the well-established
,1 As President, Madison vetoed a bill to incorporate the Episcopal Church in the District
of Columbia and refused relief for a Baptist church in the Mississippi Territory. 8 WRITINGS,
supra note 5, at 132-33 (1908). He also refused to provide chaplains in the national councils.
See 9 id. at 100 (1910). But see note 21 infra (Madison compromised by voting for incorporation of Episcopal Church in Virginia).
16 2 WRITINGS, supra note 5, at 183 (1901).
Regarding the importance of the Virginia struggle, see 1 A. STOKES, supranote 5, at 366.
" "[All Men should enjoy the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according to
the Dictates of Conscience, unpunished and unrestrained-by the Magistrate ....
1 THE

278 (R. Rutland ed. 1970).
R. KETCHAM, supra note 10, at 72.
2oMadison's language declared that "all men are equally entitled to the full and free exer-

PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON

1, See

cise [of religion and that] no man or class of men ought, on account of religion to be invested

with any particular emoluments or privileges." 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 174 (W.Hutchinson & W. Rachel eds. 1962) [hereinafter cited as PAPERS]. For a more detailed discussion
of the Declaration of Rights, see 1 A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
VIRGINIA 290-93 (1974).
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denominations.2' Proponents of assessment argued that an equal contribution by the state would prevent both tyranny by one sect and the gospel's
disappearance from portions of the state,' and that because religion promoted public virtue, its encouragement was necessary to the strength and
stability of the republic.' Madison agreed with this latter point, but he
and others2" disagreed over the appropriate means. Although almost all
opponents of assessment affirmed the value of religion, they argued that
religion would be better served by freedom of conscience and state
abstinence than by state assessment." With such opposition as a bulwark,
Madison wrote his Memorial andRemonstrance, which reveals much about
his view of government and its relationship to a healthy society. The
Memorial, which has been embraced by the modern Court as near the
original understanding of the religion clauses in the first amendment,'
can be placed in perspective by relating it to Madison's treatment
elsewhere of both control of faction through separation and the importance of multiplicity of sects and their religious values.
The View That a Responsible Government Requires Separation to
Control Faction
Madison viewed the control of faction as the fundamental problem of
American political theory-indeed of all constitution makers. He thought
the effects of faction could be better controlled by a republic than by a
democracy, and better by a large republic than a small one.' Extend the
sphere, said Madison, and so take in a greater variety of parties and in2 See H. ECKENRODE, supranote 9, at 57-58, 74-115; 1 A. STOKES, supra note 5, at 384. The
text of the bill is printed in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) (supplemental app.). Almost simultaneously a bill to incorporate the Episcopal
Church of Virginia was introduced. The Act of Incorporation passed when Madison voted
for it as a move to defeat assessment later.
[T]he necessity of some sort of incorporation for the purpose of holding and
managing the property of the church could not well be denied, nor a more
harmless modification now obtained. A negative of the bill too would have doubled
the eagerness and the pretexts for a much greater evil, a general Assessment,
which, there is good ground to believe was parried by this partial gratification
of its warmest votaries.
2 WRITINGS, supra note 5, at 113 (1901).
See H. ECKENRODE, supra note 9, at 57-58.
The original bill of 1779 to establish a state church provided that "[t]he Christian Religion
shall in all times coming be deemed and held to be the established Religion of this Commonwealth," and recited as its purpose "the encouragement of Religion and virtue." For this
and related language of the bill, see H. ECKENRODE, supra note 9, at 58. For a similar view
that religion contributes to morality of citizens, see id. at 89.
24 See H. ECKENRODE, supra note 9, at 74-115.
See id. at 89.
1 See Everson y. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947); but see Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 43 (1949) (describing problems with this interpretation).
2
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 13, at 59.

" Id. at 64.
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terests, making it unlikely that a majority will form with a common motive
to invade the rights of other citizens, or will be able to act on such a
motive." In other words, multiplicity inhibits faction.
In Virginia the causes of faction - distinct parties and interests - were
present. 1 The Memorial's argument against assessment emphasized the
tendency of religious establishment to promote faction and to leave government impotent to combat it.' Madison argued not that religion was unimportant, but rather that religious establishment is fundamentally divisive.

Moreover, not just alliance of church and state, but also accommodation
of church by state, yields uncompromising faction." The Madisonian solution was a multiplicity of religious sedts. Although he believed that sects
would police each other's and government's morals and avidity,' Madison's
critical assumption was that multiple sects embodying forebearance,
moderation and wisdom would thrive without governmental intervention.,
29

Id.

I

THE FEDERALIST

No. 51, at 351-53 (J. Madison) (J.Cooke ed. 1961).
In Virginia the liberal forces were aligned against the conservatives of the Episcopal
Church. See 1 A. STOKES, supranote 5,at 366-70. In 1784 the conservatives controlled eastern,
southern and some central counties, amounting to more than half of the state's representatives. 1 A. HOWARD, supranote 20, at 323-27. The 1776 constitution heavily favored the older,
eastern counties; such favoritism became more pronounced as time passed and people
emigrated westward and resulted in sectional arguments in the early 19th century over constitutional reform. Id. This problem was not alien to other states. See F. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860, at 161-62 (1966).
12 2 WRITINGS, supranote 5, at 187-90 (1901).
Id. at 189-9U.
Id. at 126-28; See R. KETCHAM, supra note 10, at 166.
See Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Mar. 2,1818), reprintedin 8 WRITINGS,
supranote 5, at 430-32 (1908). It has been argued that Madison was committed to the proposition that justice is the consequence of the peaceful and continuous conflict among various
factions within society. See G. BEAM, USUAL POLITICS 14-15 (1970). He considered governmental intervention as likely to result "in a conformity to the creed of the majority and a single
sect, if amounting to a majority." Madison's "DetachedMemoranda," 3 WM. & MARY Q. 561
(3d ser. E. Fleet ed. 1946).
The debates on the first amendment are instructive. Huntington urged that the amendment be worded to secure the "rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion,
but not to patronize those who professed no religion at all." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (Gales
& Seaton eds. 1789). Madison thought that inserting the word "national" before "religion"
would satsify the honorable gentleman. Id. Livermore proposed that that would not do; rather,
Congress shall make no laws "touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience." Id.
at 759. Madison withdrew his motion and Livermore's motion passed 31-20. 1 A. STOKES,
supra note 5 at 543 n.83. Madison's biographer, Irving Brant, has stated that this amendment "was Madison's further answer in behalf of all the American people to every attempt,
no matter how small or innocent it might seem to be, to establish religion by financial or
any other means." I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON 353-55 (1948). See also 1 A. STOKES, supra note
5, at 542-43. But the evidence is again not all that substantial: another Madison watcher has
pointed out that Madison may have considered this amendment "useful, not essential." Id.
at 548. See also 5 WRITINGS, supranote 5,at 389 (1906); 6 id. at 7 (1907). Because of the numerous
provisions in the states regarding religion, separation may well have been a method designed to bring a reconciliation to the federal convention. Joseph Story noted that while the
establishment clause prevented congressional preference of religion, it was not intended to
withdraw the Christian religion from protection by Congress. J. STORY. supra note 4, at
603-05. See also Corwin, The Supreme Court as NationalSchool Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 15 (1949).
SI
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Madison's attitude toward separation, therefore, likely depended on his
conviction that separation controls faction and indirectly fosters multiplicity of interests. His experience-that religious diversity prevented those
inclined to privilege or tyranny from succeeding- confirmed his more
general theory that freedom was most secure in the presence of multiple
countervailing forces checking the tyrannical impulses of any individual
group. Because multiple, moderate rival sects were then at work in
America, Madison could argue that a "perfect separation" between government and religion had allowed both to exist with "greater purity" and
that any deviation from this "strict principle" ought to be excoriated.3 8
Government might intervene only to prevent invasion of one sect's rights
by another, and thus to restore balance and to inhibit faction. If changing
circumstances have invalidated Madison's views that faction is the fundamental problem of constitution makers and that religious establishment
promotes faction, then the present applicability of his separationism requires re-examination, particularly in light of his view that the republic
requires religious and moral restraints.
The View That SeparationEncourages Religion and a
Moderate Government
A healthy republic must not simply limit faction through external controls, but also must develop social and moral restraints on both governors and governed.3 7 Although at least one commentator has argued that
Madison failed to recognize this requirement, 8 Madison observed that
political irresponsibility often accompanied the moral degeneration of a
people.3 9 He saw no conflict between religious liberty and inculcation of
religious values." Distinguishing the province of Caesar from the kingdom
of God clarified the duties owed to both, he argued.4' Moreover, he believed
that separation best allowed religious instruction to be diffused throughout
the community.42 Madison's argument for separation, therefore, rests
neither on individual conscience as a preferred freedom, nor on the single
' Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), reprinted in 9
supranote 5, at 100-02 (1907). On the other hand, there is an estimate that church

WRITINGS,

affiliation at the time of the founding of the republic reached only four percent of the population. See Garrison, History of Anti Catholicismin America, in SOCIAL ACTION 9 (1948).
1 See K. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION 228 app., at 236-44 (1st ed. 1953).
3

G. BEAM, supranote 35, at 27-29.

" Madison, Report on the Resolutions of 1799, reprintedin 6 WRITINGS, supra note 5, at 352
(1906); 1 PAPERS. supra note 20, at 96.See also H. COLBOURN,THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE 50(1965);
R. KETCHAM, supra note 10, at 299-300.
4 Madison thought that religion as an important moral restraint would grow spontaneously,

without governmental incentive. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams, reprinted in
9 WRITINGS, supranote 5, at 484 (1910).
"Madison's "Detatched Memoranda," 3 supra note 35, at 555.
42

See id. at 559.
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argument that tyranny is the necessary outcome of governmental involvement, but rather on separation's control of faction and indirect promotion of religious values. History seems largely 4to
have vindicated Madison:
3
the trend to multiplicity has been constant.
Separation, by promoting religious values, also promoted the moderate
and limited government Madison thought essential. Separation allowed
government flexibility by freeing it from involvement in questions of
religious doctrine." The maximum potential of the political sytem could
be realized only if political conflicts were solved at the low tension levels
attainable only when religion is independent of government. 4' Thus,
although it has been observed that the Federalistessays provide little
encouragement of morality beyond the indirect encouragement of checks
and balances,4 6 the system requires that individuals live with political
ambiguity.47 Collusion of church and state, however, tends to extinguish
ambiguity by encouraging the belief that one can define political rights
for all times and circumstances. Moreover, involvement of church with
state encourages a view of government as the definer of these and other
ultimate propositions. Separation, on the other hand, allows government
to disassociate itself from a defense of final philosophical truths.48
In sum, Madison regarded separation as a tool. It aided control of faction and fostered multiplicity of sects. Collusion served only to fan the
flame of faction, and faction could have no other result than the destruction of multiplicity, the preserver of religious and civil rights. Although
Madison saw no possible conflict between controlling faction by separa'1 See 1 A. STOKES, supra note 5, at 54. Such multiplicity was due largely to the peculiar
features of the growth of the United States: the extent of territory, the opening of the frontier, the Civil War, racial strains and the American's natural independence. Id. The import
of certain of these factors has abated. Nevertheless, in 1940 as many as 256 religious bodies
existed in the United States. THE YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN CHURCHES 54 (1940).
" Madison was close to Hume and the philosophy of the Enlightenment espousing man's
ability to reason, but nevertheless entertained doubts about the people's ability to define
ultimate philosophical truths. Collusion of church and state, he thought, encouraged such
an attempt to define ultimate truths. D. LUTZ, JAMES MADISON AS ACONFLICT THEORIST 79-97
(1969). See also Adair, "ThatPoliticsMay Be Reduced to a Sciene':DavidHume, James Madison,
and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON LiB. Q. 343 (1957); Adair, The Tenth Federalist
Revisited, 8 WM. & MARY Q.48 (3d ser. 1951).
'1 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 46,53,63 (J. Madison); 2 WRITINGS, supra note 5, at 362 (1901);
J. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY 21-22 (1967); Diamond, Democracy and the Federalist:
A Reconsideration of the Framer'sIntent, 53 AM. POL. ScI.REV. 52-68 (1959).
"1E.g., Carey, Federalism:A Defense of PoliticalProcess, in FEDERALISM 48 (V. Earle ed.
1968).
'1 For a more extended discussion of the necessity of ambiguity, see D. LUTZ, JAMES
MADISON AS A CONFLICT THEORIST 79-97 (1969). Consider also the connection of Madison and
Hume in Adair, "That PoliticsMay Be Reduced to a Science": David Hume, James Madison
and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON Lm. Q.343 (1957), and in Adair, The TenthFederalist
Revisited, 8 WM. & MARY Q.48 (3d ser. 1951). Madison was aware that the definition of what
constituted rights adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community was somewhat vague. G. DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST 274 (1960).
11G.DIETZE, supra note 47, at 57.
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tion and encouraging multiplicity by separation, an overview of his separationism could help one to reconcile the increasing modern conflict between
control of faction and preservation of multiplicity. To understand this
modern conflict one will also need an understanding of how prior courts
have set precedent on the basis of a compartmentalized view of Madison's
thought-a view with a wall between his concepts of religion and of
government.
THE MODERN COURT RELIANCE ON MADISON
Pre-Burger Court Decisions: 1947-1969
Either of the two religion clauses, if pushed to the extreme, can violate
the other.4 The modern Court at least arguably has put the free exercise
clause above the establishment clause,5° perhaps in part because of the
Court's incomplete understanding of Madison's political philosophy. In
fairness to the Court, history did little to force it to understand Madison
in depth. Prior to the 1940's, multiple sects with little need for governmental aid pervaded the country, and religious controversies were mostly
limited to transcendental matters.5 1 In 1940, however, in Cantwell v.
Connecticut the Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the religion clauses of the first amendment.In Everson v. Board of Education" Justice Black, in his opinion for a
narrowly divided Court, upheld a New Jersey law reimbursing parents
of both public and private school pupils for public transportation fares
to school. Although the program provided an indirect benefit to religious
schools, of greater interest is that the Court articulated an expansive interpretation of the first amendment, with Virginia's history and Madison's
intent as support. Recounting the history of religious faction and inequity in colonial Virginia, the Court concluded that "[t]hese practices became
so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of
abhorrence." ' Following Madison, the Court argued that the people's individual religious liberty can be secured best under a neutral government,
one which neither supports nor assists religion." From this proposition,
Justice Black concluded that New Jersey could not exclude its citizens
"' Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
' See Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115,1139 (1973). This conflict
between the free exercise and the establishment clauses should not be confused with the
conflict between preservation of multiplicity and control of faction.
51 See F. LITTELL, FROM STATE CHURCH TO PLURALISM 39-41 (1962).
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
' Id. at 303.,

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6 Id. at 11.
58 Id.
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public welfare legislation either because of their
from benefiting from
5
"faith or lack of it."
Madison's opposition to establishment and support for separation was
designed, however, to control faction, to encourage multiplicity and to clear
the way for development of habits of virtue. That he meant to protect
individual lack of faith is not at all clear.' The Court failed to understand
that Madison's separation was a means rather than an end in itself. Justice
Black's argument was limited to religion as equivalent to secular conscience. So limiting the argument and overlooking the possible conflict between the free exercise and establishment clauses allows an absolutist
separationism to flourish. Because the Court failed to perceive Madison's
broader goals, it necessarily failed as well to see that these goals-in a
way unforeseen by Madison-were increasingly coming into conflict with
each other. Viewing separation as an end in itself, the Court failed to consider whether separation should be redirected to fulfill the Madisonian
goals. Regardless of their opinions of the case, both the majority59 and
the dissenters" in Everson insisted that separation be absolute.
Consequently, the Everson Court did not address the possibilities that
strict neutrality might result in the demise of parochial education, that
even minimal intervention by government to encourage the survival of
multiplicity might encourage faction, or that not all forms and degrees
of governmental intervention might have the same factious effects.
Although Madison argued that no science- of government is precise," the
Court in Everson turned a deaf ear to his advice by ignoring the purposes
of separation.
The Court's unwillingness to consider the effects of different degrees
and kinds of aid on faction appeared again in Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Education2 In McCollum the Court invalidated a program of
released time religious instruction on school property. To say that appellants were wrong when they argued that the first amendment was intended only to forbid government's preference of one religion over
another" does not explain why the Court should have allowed Everson's
busing to religious instruction but not McCollum's released time for that
instruction on school property. A distinction can be made neither by a
broad interpretation of the first amendment nor by reference to the
Id. at 16.
See 5 WRITINGS, supranote 5, at 176 (1904); 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 118-20,148-49 (2d ed. J.Elliot ed. 1881). Madison
did describe separation of church and state as "the great barrier against usurpations on the
right of conscience." 1 Madison, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 251 (P. Fendall ed. 1865).
See 330 U.S. at 18.
See id. at 24-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 31-33, 52,59,63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
61 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 235 (J. Madison) (J. Cookeed. 1961).

333 U.S. 203 (1948).
Id. at 211.
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framers' intent, but only on the basis of which program is more likely to
incite faction. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence" alone reached this point.
Justice Frankfurter differed from the majority in his willingness to interrelate Madison's concepts of religious freedom, government and
society. 5 The majority's argument was that government and religion both
could perform best when not interfering with one another." Justice
Frankfurter carried this point further. Although he recognized that the
individual's right to free exercise of worship together with the duty of
public schools to inculcate morality sometimes precludes absolute separation, he echoed Madison when he recognized as well that to allow religious
instruction on school grounds tends to promote destructive religious
conflicts.
The Warren Court later indirectly encountered the conflict of absolute
separation with preservation of multiplicity and religious values. In Zorach
v. Clauson," the Court upheld a New York education law allowing public
schools to release students during school hours for religious instruction
away from school grounds. The Court's neutrality became more flexible
as the Court argued that the religiousness of the people demands public
accommodation of spiritual needs. The Court said that the Constitution
did not require the government to show "callous indifference to religious
groups."69 Neutrality, properly conceived, allows for accommodation of
religious values and pluralism if there is no overt religious instruction
on school grounds,"0 no direct financial help 1 and no forcing of religion.2
Although, according to Justice Douglas, a just government must be
" "[Algreement, in the abstract, that the First Amendment was designed to erect a 'wall
of separation between church and State,' does not preclude a clash of views as to what the
wall separates." Id. at 213 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter concluded that
secular public education was designed to promote cohesion in a heterogeneous society, and
therefore must keep "scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects:' Id at 216-17.
See id.at 214-17.

Id. at 212.

',

67 Id. at

216-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Jackson came close to Madison's faction argument in his concurring opinion:
To lay down a sweeping constitutional doctrine as demanded by complainant
and apparently approved by the Court, applicable alike to all school boards of
the nation, "to immediately adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting
all instruction in and teaching of religious education in all public schools," is to
decree a uniform, rigid and, if we are consistent, an unchanging standard for
countless school boards representing and serving highly localized groups which
not only differ from each other but which themselves from time to time change
attitudes.
Id. at 237 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also J. MADISON, Spiritof Goveritent,in 6 WRITINGS,
supra note 5, at 93 (1906).
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
"

Id. at 314.

7oSee
'

id. at 308.

See id. at 308-09.

See id. at 311, 314.
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neutral, 3 "[t]he First Amendment... does not say that in every and all
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State.""
The Zorach Court thus realized that separation as absolute neutrality
may create "hostile, suspicious and even unfriendly"" relations between
church and state. Absolute neutrality may also inhibit the growth of
religious values by preferring "those who believe in no religion over those
who do believe." 6 Accommodation, rather than strict neutrality, encourages a multiplicity of religious sects which inculcate moral values.
Zorach, then, saw neutrality as a tool designed to promote the substantive value of religious heterogeneity in America. Such indirect advancement of religious values does not impermissibly advance religion. This procedural, flexible neutrality is not an end in itself. It is instead evaluated
by examining its goals. The Zorach Court found minimal aid necessary
to preserve religious values. Perhaps without realizing it, the Court implicitly questioned whether separation as absolute neutrality encourages
multiplicity.' However, the Court did not articulate its move from absolute
neutrality to this new kind of neutrality.
After Zorach the Warren Court moved back to the position that any
aid affronts individual liberty. In Engel v. Vitale,7' the first school prayer
decision, Justice Black, writing for the majority, touched only briefly on
the potential divisiveness of church-state entanglement. 9 Instead of
developing the point, he emphasized that a religious people's traditions
require no governmental support."0 Separation was again identified
primarily with preserving individual liberty by avoiding governmental
tyranny."'
The Court's neglect of divisiveness later worked to its detriment in
Board of Education v. Allen." Allen involved a challenge to a New York
statute authorizing public schools to loan textbooks free of charge to
students in private schools. Because only those textbooks approved by
public school authorities could be lent, the Court upheld a state court's
determination that the statute was "'completely neutral with respect to
See id. at 311, 313-14.

Id. at 312. Justice Douglas distinguished McCollum from Zorach because in the latter
the "public schools do no more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside
7'

religious instruction." Id. at 315.
'

Id. at 312.
Id- at 314.
See id. at 318-20 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
370 U.S. 421 (1962).

Id. at 431.
Id. at 435.
s,Id. at 432-33. This perspective continued in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963). The Court said that "[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream
may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, 'it is proper to take
alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.'" Id. at 225.
2 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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religion.' "I The Court implied that multiplicity, here of parochial schools
and their high-quality education, is an important value.' Again, neutrality was treated not as total abstention, but rather as permitting those programs that benefit all by preserving multiplicity. The Court gave no reason
for its shift from absolute separation to requiring only procedural neutrality and a secular purpose. Although neutrality was mentioned,85 the majority made little attempt to relate it to multiplicity, and made no attempt
to determine how such aid as textbook loans affects factiousness.
Justice Harlan considered faction in his concurrence, however."6
Although he agreed that neutrality was not absolute, Justice Harlan
recognized that neutrality is "a coat of many colors."' He observed:
I would hold that where the contested governmental activity is
calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the competence of the State, and where the activity does not involve the State
"so significantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give
rise to... divisive influences and inhibitions offreedom," it is not forbidden by the religious clauses of the First Amendment.'
Before the appointment of Chief Justice Burger, the Court generally
treated separationism as an end in itself and almost never judged neutrality by its consequences of limiting faction and preserving multiple sects. 7
The Court limited separationism, in the name of free exercise, only when
multiplicity was threatened. Then, if the challenged aid did not offend the
establishment clause, it was allowed to stand without discussion of its possible divisiveness.
The Burger Court
Benevolent Neutrality and the Divisiveness Test
The Burger Court began to address the conflict between the Madisonian
values of control of faction and promotion of multiplicity. The early Burger
Court, like the Warren Court, found much value in multiplicity. In Walz
Id. at 241 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 117, 228 N.E.2d 791, 794, 281
N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1967)).
" See 392 U.S. at 247-48 & n.9.
' E.g., id. at 241.
See id. at 249 (Harlan, J., concurring).
87 Id.

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The notable exceptions were: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962) Douglas, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); id. at 315 (Black, J., dissenting); Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id.
at 232 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Black's argument in his Zorach dissent for absolute
separation as the only barrier to injecting "political and party prejudices into a holy field,"
343 U.S. at 320, is distinctly Madisonian.
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v. Tax Commission," Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, coined
the term "benevolent neutrality."'" Holding that the New York City Tax
Commission could grant property tax exemptions to religious organizations
for property used solely for religious worship, the Court found constitutional neutrality broad enough to permit such state accommodation of free
exercise of religion.92 Indeed, the Chief Justice argued, the attenuated involvement of tax exemption not only encouraged multiplicity, but avoided
excessive entanglement as well. 9 3 Because Chief Justice Burger observed
that the "tendency of a principle [is] to expand itself to the limit of its logic,"',
the Court adopted an organic, rather than a philosophic, view of neutrality: a just government may be neutral, but its neutrality demands a vigilance
not required by a logical principle. 5
Chief Justice Burger's Walz argument is important for its development
of the factious potential of absolute separationism. Expanding the argument that Justice Douglas refused in Zorach v. Clauson," Chief Justice
Burger argued that some governmental involvement may avoid the excessive involvement that absolute separation might entail.' Thus, the Chief
Justice observed that "[i]n analyzing either alternative [taxing or exempting churches], the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and
whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance
leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement."9 No longer was the
establishment clause construed as absolutely neutral toward religion; it was
now neutral only in avoiding preference for particular religious sects.
Although avoidance of faction and promotion of multiplicity were preserved by the minimal involvement of tax exemption, the Walz Court warned
that faction might emerge in other promotions of multiplicity." Justice Brennan, concurring, argued that although religious institutions contribute to
90397 U.S. 664 (1970).
11Id. at 669.
92 See id. at 669, 673. Chief Justice Burger's reasoning accords with Madison's argument
that "[n]o Government is perhaps reducible to a sole principle of operation. Where the theory
approaches nearest to this character, different and often heterogeneous principles mingle
their influence in the administration." J. MADISON, SpiritofGovernments, in 6 WRITINGS, SUpra
note 5, at 93 (1906).
" 397 U.S. at 678.
'" Id. at 678-79 (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921)). Cf.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,217 (1963) (suggesting that because Supreme
Court was consistent, those criticizing its logic were engaged in mere "academic exercises").
"' See 397 U.S. at 669-70. Chief Justice Burger apparently attempted to avoid contributing
to faction by observing that New York included churches within a group which also included
hospitals, libraries, and historical and patriotic groups. Id. at 672-73. He explained that "[t]he
State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life," id. at 673, and as groups which foster the community's 'moral
or mental improvement,'" id. at 672.
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
397 U.S. at 674-75.
" I& at 675.
" Id. at 674-75.
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the development of the community and to pluralism, benevolent neutrality must stop before it becomes too involved with religion."' 0 His reasoning
was echoed by Justice Harlan, who seemed to warn that if even minimal
involvement, although aiding pluralism, aids faction as well, the Court will
stop it: "It is always possible to shrink from a first step lest the momentum will plunge the law into pitfalls that lie in the trail ahead. I, for one,
however, do not believe that a 'slippery slope' is necessarily without constitutional toehold." 101
Unlike the Warren Court in Allen, then, the Burger Court seemed willing to weigh values. Using neutrality as its guide, the Court explored what
is lost through absolute separationism and found that strict separation not
only inhibits multiplicity but also may encourage faction. In contrast,
benevolent neutrality allowed the Court to satisfy both its goals in Walzencouragement of multiplicity and limitation of faction.
Benevolent neutrality proved less than a panacea in subsequent cases,
however. In Lemon v. Kurtzman'0 ' the Court considered district court
judgments in challenges to Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes. While
the Rhode Island act, which provided for a fifteen percent salary supplement to private school teachers, had been invalidated below,"0 3 the Pennsylvania act, which authorized "purchasing" certain secular educational services from private schools, had been sustained.'04 The Court noted that in
both programs, reimbursement was restricted to courses in secular subjects that used approved textbooks and materials."'
The Court held both programs invalid, primarily because of the dangers
of entanglement.0 0 Although Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
was aware of the value of multiple sects,' 7 he was unwilling to authorize
a program that would require "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance."'' 8 Compared with the Warren Court, the Burger
Court was relatively unconcerned about whether a program advanced
" Id. at 689-90 (Brennan, J., concurring). One could extend the argument to support governmental subsidies for moral improvement. Justice Brennan contended, however, that benevolent
neutrality must be balanced with the value of separation. For a more extensive argument,
see Freund, PublicAid to ParochialSchools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680,1687 n.16 (1969) ("The symbolism of tax exemption is significant as a manifestation that organized religion is not ex-

pected to support the state; by the same token the state is not expected to support the
church."). But cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 704 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (the Walz facts
represent a direct subsidy).
l, 397 U.S. at 699-700 (Harlan, J., concurring).
102

403 U.S. 602 (1971).

DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
103

,04Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
, 403 U.S. at 619, 621.
104 Id. at 615.
107E.g., id. at 623, 625.
100 Id. at 619.
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religion. According to the Burger Court, the issue was the governmental
intervention required by the program. The Court concluded that subsidies
differ from textbook loans not because they involve more direct aid to
religion, but because they require more surveillance." 9 In Lemon preservation of multiplicity was less compelling than the threat of entanglement
or faction.
Moreover, the Court in Lemon took a long-range view of the divisiveness
of the challenged programs. It noted.particularly that because of the high
attendance at church-related schools in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island,
upholding the statutes might produce a coalition of political and religious
groups" -in short, a faction. Responding to this threat, the Court expanded
its entanglement test to include consideration of the probability that a program would arouse intense feelings in the community and generate inflated
demands for aid."' Chief Justice Burger urged that the Court beware the
constitutional momentum developed by the validation of certain programs,"'13
thus echoing Justice Black's dissent in Board of Education v. Allen
Although Chief Justice Burger admitted the importance of multiplicity in
American life"' and recognized the financial plight of parochial schools,'
he noted that the current practice places the burden for supporting such
multiplicity primarily on "faithful adherents."'1 0
In retrospect, the disposition in Lemon appears based on two broad assertions: first, that "political fragmentation and division along religious lines
[was] one of the principal evils"'1 7 against which the first amendment was
directed, 8 and second, that even potential divisiveness threatened the normal political process by diverting people from other important issues."
The Court in Lemon, although willing to invoke benevolent neutrality to
preserve pluralistic influences, was the first Court explicitly to recognize
that governmental involvement, even though neutral, might still encourage
faction. It was the first Court as well to perceive that absolute separation
1" Id. at 616-17, 619, 621.
"' Id. at 622. The Court also observed that "[tihe potential for political divisiveness related
to religious belief and practice is aggravated in these two statutory programs by the need
for continuing annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs
and populations grow." Id. at 623.
Id. at 622.
"'
1

"'

Id.

at 624-25.

392 U.S. 236, 253 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
See 403 U.S. at 625.

115Id.
lieId.

"' Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (quoted in Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term-Foreword:ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 104, 109 (1975).

"

403 U.S. at 622. Many commentators think that this concern over divisiveness affronts

free speech. See, e.g., Lewin, DisentanglingMyth from Reality, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 107,111(1974);
Monaghan, supranote 117, at 109-10; Valente & Stanmeyer, PublicAidto ParochialSchools-A

Reply to ProfessorFreund, 59 GEo. L.J. 59, 68-69 (1970).
"1 403 U.S. at 622-23.
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might not allow pluralistic influences to survive. But most important, it
was the first Court to recognize that the same involvement that encourages
multiplicity might also encourage faction.
Divisiveness in Context
When preservation of multiplicity and discouragement of entanglement
and faction collided in challenged programs, the early Burger Court seemed to place prevention of entanglement first in its priorities. Moreover,
20
beginning with Tilton v. Richardson'
and Committeefor PublicEducation
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist," the Court increasingly evaluated the potential for factiousness in the particular "communities" involved. Thus, in Tilton
the Court upheld federal construction grants to four church-related colleges
and universities in Connecticut. Aware of Justice White's warning in Lemon
that without federal funding some institutions might have to close their
doors,'2 the plurality in Tilton upheld the grants with the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality. Although Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
plurality, argued that three factors in the programs, considered together,
sufficed to control the outcome of the case, ' he also distinguished the institutions and communities involved in Tilton- colleges and universities from those in Lemon- elementary and secondary schools.'24 He observed
that the appellants did not point "to any continuing religious aggravation
on this matter in the political processes. Possibly this can be explained by
the character and diversity of the recipient colleges and universities and
the absence of any intimate continuing relationship or dependency between
government and religiously affiliated institutions."1"
In Nyquist the character and diversity of the community were even more
important. New York's education and tax law amendments had established three financial aid programs for private elementary and secondary
schools, based in part on legislative findings that the right to select among
alternative educational systems should be available in a pluralistic society
and that the fiscal crisis in nonpublic education had caused a diminution
of facilities in low-income urban areas."6 The Court held all provisions unconstitutional. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, found that the effect
of both programs was to advance the religious mission of the recipient sectarian schools." But he went further. Whereas the tax exemption challeng403 U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality opinion).
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
'2 403 U.S. at 664 (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
403 U.S. at 687-88 (plurality opinion). The factors were lack of religious indoctrination as a purpose of the colleges and universities, "the nonideological character
of the aid" and the "one-time, single-purpose [nature of the] construction grant." Id.
124 Id. at 688-89.
'25
Id. at 688.
126 413 U.S. at 763-67.
" See id. at 794.
12
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ed in Walz applied to all religious, educational or charitable groups, the
recipients in Nyquist were a much narrower class than that exempted from
property taxation in Walz. 30 Not only would the Nyquist plan require continuing state surveillance, but "assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for the entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion."'"0 Here, entanglement was extended to include that which results when shifting majorities are replaced by
permanent ones.13 Entanglement both causes political divisions along
religious lines and results from those divisions as people become aware of
them and either challenge or seek to exploit them. 3' Justice Powell rejected
the New York statute not merely because of its continuing appropriations,
but also because the proposed aid program would "become entrenched,
and generate [its] own aggressive constituencies," thereby resulting
..
in political division.13 He hinted that he would not increase the tendency
toward faction, even if avoiding the tendency required withholding aid to
faltering sects." His concern raises a central Madisonian problem: the consequences of a view of government as provider. Government not only loses
apparent legitimacy when it fails to meet demands, but also contributes
to the formation of impatient, immoderate and avaricious majorities when
it encourages its constituents to plead all grievances before it. Justice
Powell thus spoke directly to the potential conflict between encouragement
of multiple sects and control of faction. He did not explain, however, why
textbook loans never "in part have the effect of advancing religion,""' an
effect that invalidated the expiration after twenty years of the restriction
in Tilton requiring the use of the government-subsidized buildings for
nonreligious purposes." Although religious values and multiplicity may
follow "the best of our traditions" 3 ' and discourage faction, the extent to
which the state may intercede to ensure that multiplicity is unclear.
Id.
Id.
130 See id. at 797.
31 See id.; cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 645-46 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (recounting 18th & 19th century New York
experience in which Methodist, Presbyterian, and Jewish schools requested funds
which Catholic schools had been given earlier).
132 413 U.S. at 797; See id. at 794-98; cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 283 (J. Madison)
128
129

(J.Cooke ed. 1961) ("But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned before public bodies as well as individuals, by the
clamours of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain:').
'" See 413 U.S. at 788-89. The meaning of multiplicity may have grown more complicated
by coming to include not only determination of number of sects, but also consideration of
whether a religion views parochial education as fundamental. To give no aid would not mean
the demise of sects, but pluralism in religious education might atrophy.
34 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 683 (plurality opinion).
133

Id.

" Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 314; see A. STOKES, supranote 5, at 538 n.135; Meiklejohn,
EducationalCooperationBetween Church and State, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 61, 71 (1949).
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' illustrates the elusiveness
Meek v. Pittenger37
of the Burger Court's
criteria for resolving potential conflicts between the Madisonian goals.
Pennsylvania authorized providing pupils in private elementary and secondary schools such auxiliary services as speech and hearing therapy and
assistance for educationally exceptional or disadvantaged students, and
authorized loans of textbooks." The state also authorized loaning instructional materials and equipment to private schools. 39 The Supreme Court
invalidated all provisions of the act except the textbook loan program. The
Justices differed, however, over the part that the entanglement or
divisiveness test should play in Meek. Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall dissented in part on the ground that because the textbook loans were
as divisive as the other programs, the whole should have been invalidated.'40
Justices Burger, Rehnquist and White dissented in part because, inter alia,
all programs were sufficiently nonentangling and therefore should have
been sustained. 41
If the Court is willing to attribute an element of cooperation to the
nonestablishment and free exercise clauses, it will be unable to answer the
claim that the wall of separation is an obsolete metaphor' 2 A way for the
Court to extricate itself from its dilemma is to evaluate whether a program,
no matter how valuable, would too strongly tend to create inflated appetites
and increase faction by contributing to the creation of ever more aggressive
religious constituencies.

The Emerging Conflict
The early Burger Court cases reveal that Madison's goals of controlling
faction and encouraging multiplicity of sects have begun, by the modern

13

'

421 U.S. 349 (1975).
Id. at 352-54.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 373-85 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). One might conclude

from Professor Freund's analysis that conflicts over textbooks do not differ substantially
from those over choice of teachers. See generally Freund, supra note 100, at 1683. For a response
to Professor Freund, see Valente & Stanmeyer, supra note 118. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. at 635-36 (Douglas, J., concurring); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). If the distinction between texts and other programs is not valid, this invalidity might lead one to conclude that neither form of aid should be upheld. But see Meek, 421 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part).

.41
421 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Id. at 387 (Rehnquist, J., joined by White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). The Chief Justice argued

that the Court "turns the Religion Clauses on their heads," id. at 387 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part), by finding unconstitutional the state's providing services,
for example, to handicapped students only because they attend a church-related school. Id.
at 386-87 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
14

See Stanmeyer, Free Exercise and the Wall: The Obsolescence of a Metaphor, 37 GEO.
L. REV. 243 (1968).
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era at least, to conflict with each other. No longer do all sects seem capable
of thriving without governmental aid. Consequently, the Court has validated
some forms of aid-particularly and consistently loans of texts directly to
students-while seemingly ignoring the factious potential of such aid. Three
of the Burger Court's more recent opinions illustrate what may be a trend
in the Court toward ignoring its own divisiveness test.
In Roemer v. Board ofPublic Works' the challenged statute authorized
annual fiscal-year subsidies to private institutions of higher learning, provided they met minimum state requirements, awarded more than merely
theological degrees and used the subsidy only for secular purposes.144
Although Justice Blackmun, writing for plurality, argued that the Court
faithfully must apply the principles governing public aid to church schools,"4
the plurality opinion distinguished the earlier entanglement opinions in
Lemon v. Kurtzman and Tilton v. Richardson.The plurality in Tilton had
agreed with the recognition in Lemon that continuing financial relationships, annual audits or governmental analysis of an institution's expenditures would necessarily involve church and state in continuing struggles
over financial aid.148 The plurality in Roemer, however, insisted that faction there would not occur because the secular and sectarian activities of
colleges are so easily separated 14 7 and because the occasional state audits
would be "'quick and non-judgmental.' "148 Some readers of the case may
not believe that the plurality adequately explained how it came to such
a conviction and how such grants could avoid encouraging divisive demands
for increasing aid to religious groups. 4 9
0 arose further illustrates that
That the dispute in Wolman v. Walter"'
the Court's vacillation encourages states to seek new ways to aid churchrelated schools.' The challenged Ohio statute authorized the state to provide private school pupils with books, instructional materials and equipment, standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services, therapeutic and
remedial services, and field trips.5 ' The Court again upheld the provision
1

426 U.S. 736 (1976).

144Id. at 740.
"

Id. at 754.

14

See id. at 688 (these characteristics not present in Tilton).

426 U.S. at 764,766-67. The concurring opinion apparently agreed. See id. at 769-70 (White,
J., concurring).
1"I Id. at 764 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282,
1296 (D. Md. 1974)).
"' In his dissent, 426 U.S. at 770-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan referred to
his concurring opinion in Abington, in which he said that general subsidies "tend to promote
that type of interdependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was
designed to prevent." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring). Justice Brennan was worried in part about secularization of a creed. 426 U.S.
at 772.
l5 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
Id. at 266 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
i
Id. at 233 (majority opinion).
',
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of textbooks, and upheld provision of standardized testing and scoring,
diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services, but ruled unconstitutional the provision of instructional materials and services and field
trips.'
'1

The Court's reasoning with regard to instructional materials and equipment shows its continuing willingness to uphold at-any cost such other forms
of aid as textbooks. Ohio previously had lent material and equipment directly to private schools." After such loans were invalidated by Meek v. Pittenger, the legislature decided to channel the goods through the pupils. The
Court held that despite this technical change, the program was essentially
the same, and that because of the impossibility of separating the secular
and sectarian educational function of loans of equipment, the loans in part
impermissibly aided religion. 5 How can the Court persuasively distinguish
loans of textbooks from loans of instructional materials and equipment?
The answer is that it cannot; it simply ignores the inconsistency and chooses
in the textbook loan context to encourage multiplicity. Such inconsistency
not only encourages states to try new forms of aid, but also supplies ripe
fields in which dissenters sow their seeds. Justice Marshall's Wolman
opinion" pointed out the tension 7 between Allen and Meek and argued
that to contrast a loan to students with a loan to schools is to make a false
distinction.' His discussion of entanglement"9 is of particular interest here.
For the first time, a Justice recognized that textbook loans are substantial
aid: "This danger [of entanglement] exists whether the appropriations are
made to fund textbooks, other instructional supplies, or, as in Lemon,
teachers' salaries."'' Justice Marshall therefore urged the Court to overrule Allen and to draw a line of separation that allows only general welfare
programs.'
The Court's unwillingness to consider the conflict between control of faction and encouragement of multiplicity continued in Committeefor Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan.' After the invalidation of the
previous statute,"3 which had, appropriated public funds to reimburse
church-sponsored and secular private schools for various services,", the
New York legislature enacted a new bill directing payment to private
53 Id. at 255.
" Id. & n.1.
55 433 U.S. at 250 (majority opinion).
56 Id. at 256-62 (Marshall, J., concurring

in part & dissenting
Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
Id. at 257-58 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting
,5Id. at 258-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting
"4 Id. at 258 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
...
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
62 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
"4 Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
"5

,4 444 U.S. at 648.

in part).
part).
in part).
in part).
part).
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schools of the costs incurred in compliance with the state requirements of
pupil evaluation, reporting and recordkeeping.1 5 The new statute also provided for state auditing to ensure that only actual costs incurred would
be reimbursed from state funds."' 6 The Court denied any inconsistency between Meek and Wolman, maintaining that it had never "'accepted the
recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of
an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends.' "167
The Court rejected the entanglement argument, stating that because the
issue was not annual appropriations, but only reimbursement for actual
costs, there was no reason to think that religious battles might be
provoked.1" In thus upholding the Regan reimbursement program, the Court
failed to consider adequately how support of multiplicity may encourage
faction.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, argued that the infirmity of such programs
is their direct cash payments.16 9 He reasoned that such aid would create
increasing demands for other forms of aid on the part of religious groups
and that entanglement would be fostered by the state's need to ensure that
grading not be unduly subjective, that exam questions not be used to inculcate religion and that sectarian employees be reimbursed only for secular
functions performed.17 0 The majority again ignored the potential of governmental aid for entanglement.
CONCLUSION
To clarify its confusing line of church-state decisions, the Supreme Court
should consider fully the views of James Madison, the father of the Constitution. In doing so, it must erect no wall between Madison's related ideas
on religion and government, and must recognize, as it already does occasionally, the increasing conflict between Madison's goals of controlling facremember the
tion and promoting religious multiplicity. It must also
17 1
primacy in the Madisonian scheme of avoiding faction.
The early Burger Court advanced beyond its predecessors by partially
dismantling their wall between Madison's religious and political ideas. It
recognized that church-state separation is a means rather than an end in
itself. The Burger Court's sophisticated and correct reasoning in Walz was
later elaborated into an entanglement test that echoes Madison's concern
about religious factions. After a period in which its principal concern was
'
'
7
I
Ill
1
'

Id. at 650-52.
Id. at 652.

Id. at 658 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
Id. at 661 n.8.

Id. at 665-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 669-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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faction, however, the Burger Court has increasingly upheld state efforts
to foster religious multiplicity. Although dissenters have pointed out its
inconsistency, the Court not only has been unwilling to reverse, under its
own entanglement test, the precedent allowing textbook loans, but also has
extended that precedent's logic to other potentially factious programs. The
Court must look to Madison for the principles with which to expand its entanglement test and to clarify the bearing of entanglement on the validity
of programs designed to aid religious multiplicity.
The Burger Court has proven willing and able to dismantle partially the
wall between Madison's concepts of religion and government. It has, in one
case or another, recognized both of Madison's goals. In its recent neglect
of the modern conflict between those goals, however, it has begun to replace
bricks once removed by forgetting the primacy of controlling faction. One
hopes those bricks will be removed again before the mortar sets.

